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COMMENTS
In re Estate of Wilson: Constitutional and
Trust Law Tests for the Validity of
Gender-Restricted Scholarship Trusts
By Loren E. Hillberg*
Introduction
Charitable trust funds set up to distribute scholarships provide sub-
stantial sums of money for education.1 These trusts generally provide
funds for particular classes or groups of individuals. Trusts may fund
education for students or graduates of a particular school,2 athletes,' un-
derprivileged students,4 or other groups of restricted membership.' Cer-
tain restrictions in charitable trust disbursements have been held to
violate constitutional provisions; restrictions based on race6 and religion7
* B.A., 1980, Stanford University; member, third year class.
1. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEPT. OF COMMERCE, STATISTICAL ABSTRACr OF
THE U.S. 1984, at 167 (104th ed. 1983).
2. See Harrold v. First Nat'l Bank, 93 F. Supp. 882 (N.D. Tex. 1950); In re Estate of
Wilson, 59 N.Y.2d 461, 452 N.E.2d 1228, 465 N.Y.S.2d 900 (1983) (both the Johnson and the
Wilson trusts restricted their scholarships to graduates of particular schools). See generally
G.G. BOGERT & G.T. BOGERT, THE LAW OF TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES § 375 (rev. 2d ed.
1977); 4 A. SCOTT, THE LAW OF TRUSTS § 370 (3d ed. 1967); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TRUSTS § 370 comment j (1957); Annot., 68 A.L.R.3d 997 (1976).
3. See In re Fleming's Estate, 183 P.2d 295 (Cal. Ct. App. 1947), rev'd on other grounds,
31 Cal. 2d 514, 190 P.2d 611 (1948) (scholarship recipients chosen based on performance in
golf tournament). See also 4 A. ScoTT, supra note 2, at § 370.2.
4. See Shapiro v. Columbia Union Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 576 S.W.2d 310 (Mo. 1978)
(en banc) (scholarships for Missouri boys financially unable to attend college).
5. See generally G.G. BOGERT & G.T. BOGERT, supra note 2, at § 375; 4 A. SCoTr,
supra note 2, at § 370; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 370 (1957).
6. See Trustees of the Univ. of Delaware v. Gebelein, 420 A.2d 1191 (Del. Ch. 1980);
Coffee v. William Marsh Rice Univ., 408 S.W.2d 269 (Tex. Civ. App. 1966); 4 A. SCoTT, supra
note 2, at § 399.4; Note, Restricted Scholarships, State Universities and the Fourteenth Amend-
ment, 56 VA. L. REV. 1454, 1468-71 (1970). See generally Adams, Racial and Religious Dis-
crimination in Charitable Trusts: A Current Analysis of Constitutional and Trust Law
Solutions, 25 CLEV. ST. L. REv. 1 (1976); Lusky, National Policy and the Dead Hand: The
Race-Conscious Trust, 28 REC. A.B. CITY N.Y. 265 (1973).
7. Cf. Mormon Church v. United States, 136 U.S. 1 (1890); see Note, supra note 6, at
1475-76. See generally G.G. BOGERT & G.T. BOGERT, supra note 2, at § 378; 4 A. SCOTT,
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are examples. Most cases attacking gender-based restrictions on consti-
tutional grounds, however, have been unsuccessful.' In In re Estate of
Wilson,9 the Court of Appeals of New York 10 refused to strike down
gender restrictions in two trusts. The court held that the restrictions did
not violate the Equal Protection Clause since there was no "state ac-
tion."11 Further, they did not violate traditional trust law public policy
criteria.12 The decision, while imperfect, recognizes that constitutional
law is not the only method available to challenge gender discriminatory
provisions in charitable scholarship trusts.13
Charitable trusts may be invalidated and the provisions of the trusts
reformed under the common law of trusts.14 This Comment will ex-
amine two possible grounds for reformation or invalidation of gender dis-
criminatory provisions. First, if carrying out the beneficial provisions of
a trust violates the Equal Protection Clause, a trust may be distributed to
the heirs of the settlor who established the trust. This process is called
reversion. In addition, the offending provision may be reformed to elimi-
nate its discriminatory effect through the process of cy pres.15 If the trust
or the offending provision contains an element of state action and violates
the Equal Protection Clause, its discriminatory provisions will not be en-
forced by the courts.16 Second, under the somewhat different trust law
supra note 2, at § 399.4; Adams, supra note 6; Lusky, supra note 6. But see RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 371 (1957); 4 A. SCOTT, supra note 2 at § 371; G.G. BOGaERT & G.T.
BOGaERT, supra note 2, at § 376.
8. See Trustees of the Univ. of Delaware v. Gebelein, 420 A.2d 1191 (Del. Ch. 1980)
(court struck a race restriction but refused to strike a gender restriction); Ebitz v. Pioneer Nat'l
Bank, 372 Mass. 207, 361 N.E.2d 225 (1977) (court avoided constitutional analysis but inter-
preted the phrase "young men" in a will as a generic description that included women); Sha-
piro v. Columbia Union Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 576 S.W.2d 310 (Mo. 1978) (en banc) (the
court did not find state action and sustained a demurrer). See also Lockwood v. Killian, 172
Conn. 496, 375 A.2d 998 (1977) (court rejected constitutional analysis due to a lack of state
action but reformed a trust to include women and increase trust distributions because the
beneficial provisions of the trust were too restrictive to distribute the available funds). But see
In re Crichfield Trust, 177 N.J. Super. 258, 426 A.2d 88 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1980)
(trustee succeeded in having trust for boys opened up to both male and female students on
constitutional grounds since board of education was trustee).
9. 59 N.Y.2d 461, 452 N.E.2d 1228, 465 N.Y.S.2d 900 (1983).
10. The Court of Appeals is New York's highest court. The appellate courts are known as
supreme courts.
11. Wilson, 59 N.Y.2d at 479, 452 N.E.2d at 1237, 465 N.Y.S.2d at 909.
12. Id.
13. Most prior decisions focused exclusively upon constitutional issues without considera-
tion of general trust principles. See, e.g., Shapiro v. Columbia Union Nat'l Bank & Trust Co.,
576 S.W.2d 310 (Mo. 1978) (en banc); Trustees of the Univ. of Delaware v. Gebelein, 420 A.2d
1191 (Del. Ch. 1980).
14. See infra text accompanying notes 86-91.
15. Id.
16. See infra text accompanying notes 89-90.
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analysis,17 a court may force reversion or reformation of a trust's benefi-
cial provision, if that provision violates public policy.18
In re Estate of Wilson is the first decision to fully analyze the refor-
mation of charitable scholarship trusts by applying both constitutional
and traditional trust law principles. However, the court focused almost
exclusively on constitutional issues, and failed to analyze adequately the
trust law grounds for invalidation of the trust. 9 It thus typifies numer-
ous cases that neglect the straightforward policy discussions inherent in
trust law analysis. This Comment examines key issues in the gender dis-
crimination area by exploring the New York Court's decision. Part I
explains the facts of Wilson and critiques the court's constitutional and
trust law discussions. Part II examines various "state action" theories as
they apply to the "middle-tier"" ° equal protection test. Part III discusses
trust law reformation of charitable trust provisions that violate public
policy. Finally, part IV compares the policy elements of the gender-dis-
crimination equal protection test with trust law analysis for determining
charitable trust validity.
This Comment concludes that courts may find gender-restrictions in
scholarships invalid, either constitutionally or by application of trust law.
The critical issue for the courts is whether or not these restrictions in
charitable scholarship trusts do in fact violate public policy.2' The ac-
17. For purposes of this Comment, the use of cy pres to correct a constitutional wrong
will be considered a constitutional approach, although cy pres, a traditional trust law remedy,
is used in both situations.
18. See infra notes 107-10 and accompanying text.
19. Wilson, 59 N.Y.2d at 472-74, 452 N.E.2d at 1233-34, 465 N.Y.S.2d at 905-06.
20. The middle-tier test is the Equal Protection Clause analysis applied in cases of gender
discrimination. See, e.g., Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976).
21. Different theories of public policy abound. Since some settlors are only willing to
establish scholarships for one sex, society could allow gender discrimination in order to in-
crease the total funds available for such scholarships. Compare IRS LETTER RUL. (CCH)
7744007 (July 28, 1977):
If administrators of a scholarship fund are required to name only male scholarship
recipients, such a classification based on sex is not against declared Federal public
policy and is educationally and socially beneficial to the community at large. Accord-
ingly, it is held that the restriction contained in the decedent's will authorizing schol-
arships to only males is not a bar to a charitable deduction under [I.R.C. § 2055].
with Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574 (1983) (rejecting charitable tax status for
schools discriminating on the basis of race).
Society could refuse to sanction discrimination unless it involves an attempt to overcome
past discrimination. See, e.g., Califano v. Webster, 430 U.S. 313, 317 (1977) ("reduction of the
disparity in economic condition between men and women caused by the long history of dis-
crimination against women has been recognized as such an important governmental objec-
tive"); L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 16-26 (1978). Finally, gender-based
discrimination in charitable scholarship trusts could be rejected as not furthering goals of
equal opportunity for individuals of either sex. Cf. Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 682
(1973) (plurality opinion) (suggesting the standard of review in gender-based equal protection
cases should be "strict scrutiny"); Mississippi Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 724
n.9 (1982) (reserving judgment on whether gender classifications are inherently suspect).
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ceptable boundaries of gender discrimination are the subject of national
debate far beyond the scope of this discussion. Consequently, this Com-
ment focuses on the methods courts may use to consider whether this
gender discrimination contravenes constitutional law or, alternatively,
public policy.
I. Background
A. Facts
In re Estate of Wilson consolidated two actions involving charitable
trusts established by the wills of Edwin Irving Johnson and Clark W.
Wilson. Wilson died in 1969; he left a will that established a trust to
provide funds for "five (5) young men" who attained the highest grades
in high school science courses "as may be certified to by the then Super-
intendent of Schools."22 The trust operated until the high school refused
to certify the names of candidates on the theory that the trust's gender
restrictions violated the provisions of Title IX.23 The New York
Supreme Court concluded that it was impossible to carry out the terms of
the trust, since the school was under no obligation to provide the candi-
date's names. The court then used its cy pres power to modify the trust
so that male candidates within the trust's terms could apply directly to
the trustee for the scholarships.24 The court did not strike the offending
gender restriction, although this action was within its power.25 The New
York Court of Appeals affirmed the supreme court's ruling.2 6
The Johnson trust was created by will when Edwin I. Johnson died
in 1978. The will appointed the local board of education as one of the
fund's trustees. The Johnson trust was to "be used. . . for bright and
deserving young men. . . whose parents are financially unable to send
them to college . . . [as] selected by the Board of Education."'27 The
supreme court reversed the trial court's decision to appoint a new, pri-
vate trustee who could carry out the gender restrictive terms. The court
determined that this trust reformation constituted judicial state action
22. Wilson, 59 N.Y.2d at 469, 452 N.E.2d at 1231, 465 N.Y.S.2d at 903.
23. Id. A complaint had been filed with the Office of Civil Rights, Department of Educa-
tion. The Department said this complaint would result in prosecution under 20 U.S.C. § 1681
(Title IX) (1976) if the school district continued to provide financial information based on
nongender neutral criteria. Section 1681 states in pertinent part: "No person in the United
States shall, on the basis of sex, be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or
be subjected to discrimination under any education program or activity receiving Federal fi-
nancial assistance."
24. In re Estate of Wilson, 87 A.D.2d 98, 104, 451 N.Y.S.2d 891, 894-5 (N.Y. App. Div.
1982).
25. Id. at 103, 451 N.Y.S.2d at 894.
26. Wilson, 59 N.Y.2d 461, 452 N.E.2d 1228, 465 N.Y.S.2d 900 (1983).
27. Id. at 470, 452 N.E.2d at 1231, 465 N.Y.S.2d at 903.
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and an impermissible enforcement of gender discrimination.28 The
supreme court then used its cy pres power to eliminate the gender restric-
tion as the "only" legal action it could take that would allow the trust to
operate.29 The New York Court of Appeals however, disagreed, revers-
ing the supreme court's holding on the state action issue and reinstating
the trial court ruling.30
The New York Court of Appeals concluded that trust reformation
was not state action, and therefore allowed the appointment of private
trustees to carry out the gender restrictive terms of the two trusts.31 In
addition, the court of appeals determined that the trusts' settlors, Wilson
and Johnson, only intended to provide funds for men. 2 Finally, the
court concluded that the public policy implications of gender discrimina-
tion would not "frustrate a paramount charitable purpose" of the the two
trusts; 33 the trusts' provisions, therefore, were allowed to stand even
though they discriminated based upon gender.
B. Critique
The Wilson court examined two prominent issues. The first was
whether judicial reformation of trusts constitutes state action when it al-
lows private discrimination to continue. The decisions of the United
States Supreme Court provide little guidance on this issue.34 The issue is
critical, however, because each time a trust becomes impossible to ad-
minister, a court may apply its cy pres power to reform the trust.
3 1 If
courts find use of the cy pres power to be state action, courts could then
justify striking private discriminatory restrictions that violate the equal
protection guarantees of the Fourteenth Amendment whenever they re-
formed trusts.
28. In re Johnson, 93 A.D.2d 1, 460 N.Y.S.2d 932 (N.Y. App. Div. 1983).
29. Id. at 15, 460 N.Y.S.2d at 942.
30. Wilson, 59 N.Y.2d 461, 452 N.E.2d 1228, 465 N.Y.S.2d 900 (1983).
31. Id. at 479, 452 N.E.2d at 1237, 465 N.Y.S.2d at 909.
32. Id. at 472, 452 N.E.2d at 1233, 465 N.Y.S.2d at 905.
33. Id. at 474, 452 N.E.2d at 1234, 465 N.Y.S.2d at 906. See infra notes 118-20 and
accompanying text.
34. See, e.g., Evans v. Abney, 396 U.S. 435 (1970) (allowing reversion of a trust establish-
ing a public park instead of enforcing segregation); Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948)
(rejecting court enforcement of restrictive property covenants). See generally Note, An End to
Gender-Restrictive Charitable Trusts: An Idea Whose Time Has Almost Come?, 48 UMKC L.
REV. 66, 70-73 (1979) [hereinafter cited as Note, Gender-Restrictive Charitable Trusts]; Note,
Sex Restricted Scholarships and the Charitable Trust, 59 IowA L. REv. 1000, 1002-08 (1974)
[hereinafter cited as Note, Sex Restricted Scholarships]. Several commentators have discussed
the dearth of Supreme Court legal analysis in this area. See, e.g., L. TRIBE, supra note 21, at
§ 18-2; Black, The Supreme Court, 1966 Term-Forward: 'State Action,' Equal Protection, and
California's Proposition 14, 81 HARV. L. REv. 69, 95 (1967) (state action was termed "a con-
ceptual disaster area"); Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 HARV.
L. REV. 1, 29-31 (1959).
35. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 399 comment a (1957).
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The second issue related to the court's application of trust law.
While Wilson is the first gender restrictive scholarship trust case which
takes serious aim at the trust law policy issues, the court's formulation of
these policy considerations misses the mark. The court focused on
whether the gender restrictions impaired the trusts' overall charitable
purpose. It failed to consider whether gender restrictions are so contrary
to public policy that these trusts should not be granted the privileges of
charitable status regardless of their overall purpose.3 6
II. State Action
A. What Constitutes State Action?
State action has received wide ranging treatment by the Supreme
Court. In The Civil Rights Cases,3 7 the Supreme Court held that private
discrimination did not violate the Fourteenth Amendment to the Consti-
tution.38 Since then the Court's decisions have advanced a variety of
tests to determine whether a state is sufficiently involved in private activ-
ity to implicate constitutional guarantees.39 In Burton v. Wilmington
Parking Authority," the Court stated that "[o]nly by sifting facts and
weighing circumstances can the nonobvious involvement of the State in
private conduct be attributed its true significance."41 With this vague
guidance, courts have found state action where there is a statute,42 an
official action by a state agency,43 a state employee acting under "color of
law,"' judicial enforcement of private discrimination,45 state control of
private enterprise,46 and private activity that has taken on a public
nature.47
State action issues recur in three scholarship trust situations:
(1) when public schools or public school boards are named as trust-
ees of a trust containing a discriminatory provision;
(2) when public schools are integrally involved in the approval of
applicants who will receive funds from the trust; and
36. See infra notes 107-10 and accompanying text.
37. 109 U.S. 3 (1883).
38. Id. at 11.
39. See generally infra notes 42-47 and accompanying text.
40. 365 U.S. 715 (1961).
41. Id. at 722.
42. Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
43. Green v. Connally, 330 F. Supp. 1150 (D.D.C.), afl'd mem. sub nom. Coit v. Green,
404 U.S. 997 (1971) (Internal Revenue Service decision to withdraw tax exempt status from
private schools).
44. Home Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Los Angeles, 227 U.S. 278 (1913); L. TRIBE, supra note 21, at
§ 18-4.
45. Barrows v. Jackson, 346 U.S. 249 (1953); Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948).
46. Burton v. Wilmington Parking Auth., 365 U.S. 715 (1961).
47. Evans v. Newton, 382 U.S. 296 (1965); L. TRIBE, supra note 21, at § 18-5.
rVol. 12:127
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(3) when courts exercise their cy pres power to change the trustee,
instead of the class of beneficiaries, and thus allow private discrimination
to continue.
In addition, courts may also consider whether all charitable trusts in-
volve state action, since all are accorded special publicly generated
benefits.4 s
When a public school or its board is vital to the charitable trust
scheme, then its involvement certainly qualifies as state action. With few
exceptions, courts have found state action when the state directly ad-
ministers the trust,49 or when a public school is closely involved in deter-
mining which students are eligible for funds." These trusts require
action by state officials and are thus analogous to trusts that provide pub-
lic services or goods; their very nature requires state action.5" A more
difficult question is whether court reformation of a trust instrument con-
stitutes state action, especially when it leaves discriminatory provisions
intact.
In Wilson, the court carefully considered the legal ramifications of
trust reformation that retains unconstitutional provisions. The United
States Supreme Court held that similar judicial conduct constituted
"state action" in Shelley v. Kraemer.2 In Shelley the Court directly dis-
criminated by using its enforcement powers to enforce racially restrictive
private covenants. The court in Wilson distinguished its actions from
those of the Court in Shelley by stating:
Upon finding that requisite formalities of creating a trust had been
met, the courts below determined the testator's intent, and applied
the relevant law permitting those intentions to be privately carried
out. The court's power compelled no discrimination. That dis-
crimination had been sealed in the private execution of the wills.
Recourse to the courts was had here only for the purpose of facili-
tating the administration of the trusts, not for enforcement of their
discriminatory dispositive provisions.53
48. See infra notes 56-63 and accompanying text.
49. See, eg., Trustees of the Univ. of Delaware v. Gebelein, 420 A.2d 1191 (Del. Ch.
1980); In re Crichfield Trust, 177 N.J. Super. 258, 426 A.2d 88 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div.
1980).
50. Bank of Delaware v. Buckson, 255 A.2d 710 (Del. Ch. 1969) (race restriction); Wil-
son, 59 N.Y.2d 461, 452 N.E.2d 1228, 465 N.Y.S.2d 900 (1983) (both the Johnson and Wilson
trusts involved the state in supplying scholarship applicants). Contra Shapiro v. Columbia
Union Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 576 S.W.2d 310 (Mo. 1978) (en bane) (state university's in-
volvement in processing applicants for a trust that excluded women did not constitute state
action).
51. Evans v. Newton, 382 U.S. 296 (1965); L. TRIBE, supra note 21, at § 18-5.
52. 334 U.S. 1 (1948).
53. 59 N.Y.2d at 479, 452 N.E.2d at 1237, 465 N.Y.S.2d at 909. See contra In re
Crichfield Trust, 177 N.J. Super. 258, 426 A.2d 88 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1980); In re Will
of Potter, 275 A.2d 574 (Del. Ch. 1970).
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The court of appeals thus concluded that judicial application of cy pres
was not state action. 4
The New York Court of Appeals failed to consider whether the
charitable trust itself constituted state action." It has been argued per-
suasively that charitable trusts are state action by their very nature. 6
They benefit from legal and financial options such as tax exemptions and
deductions,5 7 immunity from tort liability,58 freedom to designate an in-
definite class of beneficiaries,59 exemption from the Rule Against Perpe-
tuities, ° perpetual duration,61 and enforcement by the state attorney
general. 62 While each of these traditional benefits may be insufficient to
constitute state action individually, their aggregation may suffice. 3 As
the Supreme Court stated in Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis:'
54. 59 N.Y.2d at 479, 452 N.E.2d at 1237, 465 N.Y.S.2d at 909. Similar treatment might
be expected from the Supreme Court based upon dicta in subsequent cases explaining the
Shelley v. Kraemer decision. See Evans v. Abney, 396 U.S. 435, 445 (1970) (in allowing rever-
sion of a park that had been segregated, the court noted, "this case is also easily distinguishable
from that presented in Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948), where we held unconstitutional
state judicial action which had affirnatively enforced a private scheme of discrimination
against Negroes"); Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163, 179 (1972) ("[Shelley] makes
it clear that the application of state sanctions to enforce such a [discriminatory] rule would
violate the Fourteenth Amendment").
55. 59 N.Y.2d at 479, 452 N.E.2d at 1237, 465 N.Y.S.2d at 909. The court may have
alluded to this issue when it noted: "Although the field of trusts is regulated by the State, the
Legislature's failure to forbid private discriminatory trusts does not cause such trusts, when
they arise, to be attributable to the State." (citations omitted). This statement, however, does
not address whether the state may be fostering discrimination, solely by providing trusts with
tax benefits, tort immunities, and other exemptions from standard trust requirements.
56. See Evans v. Abney, 396 U.S. 435 (1970) (Brennan, J., dissenting); Clark, Charitable
Trusts, the Fourteenth Amendment and the Will of Stephen Girard, 66 YALE L.J. 979, 1003-04
(1957); Lusky, supra note 6; Note, Gender-Restrictive Charitable Trusts, supra note 34, at 75-
82; Note, Sex Restricted Scholarships, supra note 34, at 1005-07.
57. See Green v. Connally, 330 F. Supp. 1150 (D.D.C.), affid mem. sub nom. Coit v.
Green, 404 U.S. 997 (1971); IRS LETTER RUL. (CCH) 7744007 (July 28, 1977). Cf. Bob Jones
Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574 (1983).
58. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 402 comment d (1957). This immunity is
predicated on the general immunity accorded charitable organizations and is becoming more
limited.
59. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 364 (1957): "A charitable trust can be cre-
ated although there is no definite or definitely ascertainable beneficiary designated."
60. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 365 comment a (1957). See also Najarian,
Charitable Giving and the Rule Against Perpetuities, 70 DICK. L. REv. 455, 456 (1966).
61. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 365 (1957): "A charitable trust is not invalid
although by the terms of the trust it is to continue for an indefinite or an unlimited period."
62. Id. at § 391: "A suit can be maintained for the enforcement of a charitable trust by
the Attorney General."
63. Some cases suggest that a grant of tax-exempt status alone may qualify as state action.
See Green v. Connally, 330 F. Supp. 1150, 1164-65 (D.D.C.), affid mem. sub nom. Coit v.
Green, 404 U.S. 997 (1971). For an extensive discussion of this issue see Brown, State Action
Analysis of Tax Expenditures, 11 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 97 (1976).
64. 407 U.S. 163 (1972).
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The Court has never held, of course, that discrimination by an
otherwise private entity would be violative of the Equal Protection
Clause if the private entity receives any sort of benefit or service at
all from the State, or if it is subject to state regulation in any degree
whatever. . . Our holdings indicate that where the impetus for
the discrimination is private, the State must have "significantly in-
volved itself with invidious discriminations," Reitman v. Mulkey,
387 U.S. 369, 380 (1967), in order for the discriminatory action to
fall within the ambit of the constitutional prohibition. 65
Thus, a strong argument can be made that the substantial benefits ac-
corded charitable trusts by the state and federal governments constitute
sufficient involvement to make these trusts state action. Another possi-
bility is that these benefits may give the trusts a public character.66
Neither argument is persuasive, however, since policy considera-
tions indicate that a charitable trust does not constitute state action in
and of itself. Trusts are used extensively to finance religious activities,67
ethnic fundraising activities, 68 and a variety of other socially beneficial,
albeit discriminatory, purposes that the government must forego.69 If a
trust were state action in and of itself, then each restrictive condition
could be scrutinized under the Equal Protection Clause, and few benefici-
ary specific trusts could withstand this challenge. Thus, a court determi-
nation that charitable trusts constitute state action solely because of
governmental benefits would raise doubts about the validity of most ben-
eficiary-specific charitable trusts. Moreover, while charitable trusts de-
rive certain key characteristics from the government, it seems clear that
these trusts are essentially the product of private action. Charitable
trusts should only be considered state action when government involve-
ment extends beyond traditional trust benefits and thereby gives charita-
ble trusts a public character.
65. Id. at 173.
66. See L. TRIBE, supra note 21, at § 18-5. This is a more tenuous argument, but it might
be effective when the state has been involved peripherally with trust administration over such
an extended period of time that a particular trust is identified as a "public asset."
67. See G.G. BOGERT & G.T. BOGERT, supra note 2, at § 376; 4 A. ScoTr, supra note 2,
at § 371.
68. See, e.g., Estate of Murphy, 7 Cal. 2d 712, 62 P.2d 374 (1936) (upholding bequest to
benefit the American Jewish Congress as charitable).
69. See generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS §§ 368-74 (1957) (relief of pov-
erty, education, health, municipal purposes, and other purposes beneficial to the community).
The problem is not so much that government may not act in these areas, but that individual
settlors would not be permitted to discriminate in order to benefit a proscribed group of indi-
viduals. Limitations on a settlor's ability to benefit such groups could result in severe reduc-
tions in the level of charitable contributions, since one reason a settlor is inclined to donate
funds is his or her knowledge of the specific beneficial use to which the funds will be devoted.
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B. What Type of State Action Violates the Equal Protection Clause?
After determining that particular conduct constitutes state action,
courts then determine whether the activity violates the Equal Protection
Clause.70 The Supreme Court has concluded that in gender cases, dis-
crimination will be allowed only if the state can show that "the classifica-
tion serves 'important governmental objectives and that the
discriminatory means employed' are 'substantially related to the achieve-
ment of those objectives.' "71 This "middle-tier" test of equal protection
falls between a rational basis examination7 2 and the heightened strict
scrutiny approach applied in restrictions involving race,7 3 origin,7 4 or
religious beliefs.75
The supreme court in Johnson concluded that the gender restriction
violated the Constitution. "[Equal protection] guarantees would plainly
be violated by the award of scholarships pursuant to the bequest's sex-
based discriminatory restriction because such restriction had no substan-
tial relation to the goal of promoting higher education. ' 76 The supreme
court in Wilson, however, did not reach this issue and held only that the
school was within its rights to refuse to provide the scholarship candi-
dates' names; therefore, the trust became impossible to administer ac-
cording to its terms. The court of appeals indicated one limitation on the
Johnson court's equal protection analysis77 when it quoted from Califano
70. But cf. Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 373-74 (1974) (Marshall, J.,
dissenting) (suggesting that the Court examines the constitutional violation first and then ap-
plies the different state action standards).
71. Mississippi Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 724 (1982) (quoting Wengler v.
Druggists Mutual Ins. Co., 446 U.S. 142, 150 (1980)).
72. See, e.g., United States R.R. Retirement Bd. v. Fritz, 449 U.S. 166 (1980); New Orle-
ans v. Dukes, 427 U.S. 297 (1976).
73. See, e.g., Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967); Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S.
214 (1944).
74. See, e.g., Hernandez v. Texas, 347 U.S. 475 (1954); Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356
(1886).
75. See, e.g., Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972) (religious beliefs are protected by
the First Amendment).
Perhaps the most forthright appraisal of the scope of the various tests was made by Justice
Powell when he noted:
As has been true of Reed [v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971)] and its progeny, our decision
today will be viewed by some as a "middle-tier" approach. While I would not en-
dorse that characterization . . . , candor compels the recognition that the relatively
deferential "rational basis" standard of review normally applied takes on a sharper
focus when we address a gender-based classification.
Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 210-11 (1976) (Powell, J., concurring).
76. In re Johnson, 93 A.D.2d 1, 6-7, 460 N.Y.S.2d 932, 937 (N.Y. App. Div. 1983).
77. The Wilson court may have impliedly accepted the validity of the Johnson court's
analysis when it noted: "Proscribing the enforcement of gender restrictions in private charita-
ble trusts would operate with equal force towards trusts whose benefits are bestowed exclu-
sively on women." 59 N.Y.2d at 473, 452 N.E.2d at 1233, 465 N.Y.S.2d at 905. Thus, it may
v. Webster."78 "'Reduction of the disparity in economic condition be-
tween men and women caused by the long history of discrimination
against women has been recognized as. . .an important governmental
objective.' "9 Since historically the number of women who excel in
math and science has not equaled the number of men in these areas, these
fields are male dominated." If a fund similar to Wilson's were restricted
to women, it would qualify as an important governmental objective
within the Califano v. Webster formulation."1 If the Wilson trust had
been restricted to young women, it probably would have survived chal-
lenge by a young man under this formulation.
The supreme court in Johnson and the court of appeals in Wilson
ignored alternate governmental objectives outside the education area that
constitute important governmental interests. These additional govern-
mental interests could justify discriminatory provisions contained in a
charitable trust instrument. For example, a state may wish to increase
scholarship funding by offering testators the flexibility to fund scholar-
ships for groups the testators feel are deserving.8 2 The court of appeals
considered testator flexibility in analyzing the public policy aspects of
gender restrictions in trusts. The supreme court, however, focused solely
on "promoting higher education," 3 and ignored the potential for other
"important" objectives to which sex-based restrictions in scholarships
could be "substantially related."8 4
have been concerned that the Johnson analysis would lead inevitably to the abolition of similar
scholarships for women. To avoid this result, the court found no state action.
78. 430 U.S. 313 (1977).
79. Wilson, 59 N.Y.2d at 473,452 N.E.2d at 1233, 465 N.Y.S.2d at 905, (quoting Califano
v. Webster, 430 U.S. 313, 317 (1977)).
80. San Francisco Chron., Apr. 11, 1984, at 1, col. 6; Wash. Post, Apr. 11, 1984, at A-3,
col. 1.
81. The important objective would be the reversal of past discriminatory activities, and a
trust benefiting only women in math and scientific fields would be substantially related to the
goal of overcoming the past discrimination. Were the trust fund for the woman with the best
performance in home economics classes, the result would probably be different. See Missis-
sippi Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718 (1982).
82. The significance of this policy was eloquently described by Justice Friendly:
Philanthropy is a delicate plant whose fruits are often better than its roots; desire to
benefit one's own kind may not be the noblest of motives but it is not ignoble. It is
the very possibility of doing something different than government can do, of creating
an institution free to make choices government cannot--even seemingly arbitrary
ones-without having to provide a justification that will be examined in a court of
law, which stimulates much private giving and interest.
Friendly, The Dartmouth College Case and the Public-Private Penumbra, 12 Tax. Q. 5, 30 (2d
Supp. 1969).
83. In re Johnson, 93 A.D.2d 1, 6-7, 460 N.Y.S. 2d 932, 937 (N.Y. App. Div. 1983).
84. Id. Gender restrictions in scholarship trusts are not as closely related to settlor flexi-
bility as they are to educational interests. It is possible that prohibiting gender-restricted char-
itable trusts would not impair the benefit of flexiblity to settlors to a significant extent. If so,
there would be no substantial relation to this important governmental interest.
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In many respects, the equal protection standard applied to gender
discrimination analyzes the public policy aspects of each individual case
of state involvment in discrimination." A similar public policy review is
required within the trust law context. Moreover, trust law considers dis-
crimination regardless of state involvement and, therefore, is not bur-
dened by the state action analysis and its concomitant vagueness.
III. Trust Law
Traditional common law principles applied to charitable trusts pre-
date the Statute of Uses of 1601.16 Cy pres is the judicial tool used to
alter trusts that have a general charitable purpose but which fail in some
other manner.8 7 Under this doctrine, instead of requiring trust reversion,
courts are empowered to change the disposition of trust funds; further, a
court may alter either the administrative or dispositive provisions of a
trust through the use of the equitable cy pres power.8" The Second Re-
statement of the Law of Trusts describes cy pres:
If property is given in trust to be applied to a particular charitable
purpose, and it is or becomes impossible or impracticable or illegal
to carry out the particular purpose, and if the settlor manifested a
more general intention to devote the property to charitable pur-
poses, the trust will not fail but the court will direct the application
of the property to some charitable purpose which falls within the
general charitable intention of the settlor s9
A trust that violates the Equal Protection Clause will be reformed or will
revert to the heirs of the testator. In part, this fact explains the courts'
tendency to rely on constitutional grounds as a basis for altering trust
terms in the discrimination area.90
However, strict illegality is not the sole basis on which a court may
act to strike an offending provision. Trust purposes that violate public
85. Compare Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944) (announcing the strict
scrutiny standard for equal protection review of race discrimination) with Wooten v. Fitz-
Gerald, 440 S.W.2d 719 (Tex. Civ. App. 1969) (court reformed a racial restriction that was not
illegal, because it violated public policy against discrimination).
86. 4 A. SCOTT, supra note 2, at § 368.1.
87. Id. at § 399; see also G.G. BOGERT & G.T. BOGERT, supra note 2, at § 431; RESTATE-
MENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 399 (1957).
Courts occasionally use another power referred to as equitable deviation. This power
permits the alteration of administrative provisions in private trusts, but it may not be used to
alter their dispositive or beneficial provisions. The scope of the doctrine of cy pres is much
broader than that of equitable deviation. See 4 A. SCOTT, supra note 2, at § 381; RESTATE-
MENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS §§ 165-67, 381 (1957).
88. 4 A. SCOTT, supra note 2, at § 399; G.G. BOGERT & G.T. BOGERT, supra note 2, at
§ 431; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 399 (1957).
89. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 399 (1957) (emphasis added).
90. Illegality is a specific basis on which to render a decision, whereas a violation of public
policy is more amorphous. See generally infra notes 107-10 and accompanying text.
policy also support the use of ey pres power.91 This aspect of traditional
trust law offers an alternative to constitutional analysis for the examina-
tion of the validity of gender restrictive trusts.
A. Cy Pres Authority
Courts apply the cy pres power in two different situations: when an
invalid trust is created,92 or when a valid trust later becomes invalid.93 In
Wilson, it was argued that the Johnson trust, which never distributed
funds, was invalid at creation. 94 The Wilson trust, which became impos-
sible to administer after eleven years, was circumstantially invalid due to
the school's refusal to continue to supply the trust with the names of the
scholarship candidates. Courts are more inclined to alter, rather than
void, a trust that becomes invalid due to changes occurring over a period
of time.
95
Courts follow a two-step approach to determine the validity of char-
itable trusts. Initially, the court identifies public policy to determine
whether or not the trust is socially beneficial. Traditionally, education
has been recognized as a valid public purpose.96 Next, the court reviews
the trust's terms and instructions to determine whether its administrative
or dispositive provisions abrogate its charitable benefits. Courts accord
great deference to the settlor's intent in both the form and substance of
the trust instrument:
97
Where property is given in trust for a particular purpose and it is
legal and possible and practicable to carry out that purpose, the
court will not ordinarily permit the property to be applied to other
purposes, although the other purposes appear to the court to be
more useful and desirable than the purpose designated by the
testator.
98
91. REsTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 377 comment c (1957). See also infra notes
108-10 and accompanying text.
92. G.G. BOGERT & G.T. BOGERT, supra note 2, at § 438; 4 A. SCOTT, supra note 2, at
§ 399.2.
93. 4 A. ScoTT, supra note 2, at § 399.3.
94. In re Johnson, 93 A.D.2d 1, 460 N.Y.S.2d 932 (N.Y. App. Div. 1983).
95. 4 A. ScoTT, supra note 2, at § 399.3. The court in Wilson did not discuss the length of
time the Wilson trust had been operating. Courts interpret older trust provisions with greater
lenience, in order to prevent costly and ineffective reversion of the trust corpus after many
years. See infra notes 100-01. If either trust had been substantially older, it seems probable
that the court of appeals would have taken a less restrictive reading of the gender restrictions
in the trusts.
96. R ESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUsTs § 370 (1957) ("A trust for the advancement of
education is charitable."); G.G. BOGERT & G.T. BOGERT, supra note 2, at § 375; 4 A. ScoTT,
supra note 2, at § 370.
97. "The court will not substitute a new scheme merely because the trustee or the court
believes it would be a better plan than that which the settlor provided." G.G. BOGERT & G.T.
BOGERT, supra note 2, at §§ 368, 439.
98. 4 A. SCOTT, supra note 2, at § 399.4.
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Despite this judicial deference to the settlor's intent, courts nonetheless
scrutinize specific dispositive provisions that restrict the trust's benefi-
ciaries based on gender.99
The rationale supporting the cy pres doctrine is twofold. First, it
provides courts with a method of updating trust provisions and ensuring
that the funds are not wasted in situations where the settlor did not antic-
ipate changed conditions."°° Second, reversion-the only alternative to
the exercise of cy pres-is unsatisfactory after many years have
passed.101 Cy pres allows a court to apply funds to a purpose generally
within the scope of the settlor's intent. Any policy supporting reversion
of the funds to the settlor's heirs is outweighed if it is possible to further
the settlor's wishes through equitable redrafting of the trust instrument.
Hence, when reviewing a trust, the court must find a general chari-
table purpose in order to apply the cy pres power.102 Absence of a gen-
eral charitable purpose makes it impossible for the court to reform the
trust to further the settlor's charitable intent. Thus, if the charitable pur-
pose is specific, then the court cannot use cy pres to alter this definitive
charitable plan and the trust will revert to the heirs of the settlor1 °3 In
gender-restricted scholarship situations, only a few settlors demonstrate
specific intent to create a discriminatory instrument.1 4 In most in-
stances, the court could apply cy pres and strike the offending gender
restriction based upon the settlor's general charitable purpose to further
education. 105
In addition, the court must determine whether the discriminatory
trust provision violates public policy or law. The court then decides
whether the particular circumstances merit application of cy pres or fail-
ure of the trust instrument. 106 Cy pres will be applied if the court has
practical and viable means to reform either the trust's dispositive or ad-
ministrative provisions while furthering the testator's intent.
B. Public Policy as Grounds for Exercise of Cy Pres Powers
A showing of an illegal trust purpose mandates reversion or refor-
99. See supra note 8 and accompanying text.
100. See 4 A. ScoTT, supra note 2, at § 399.3.
101. Id. The cost of tracing the heirs of the settlor is often so high that the trust's expendi-
tures greatly diminish the amount of funds ultimately delivered.
102. G.G. BOGERT & G.T. BOGERT, supra note 2, at §§ 436-37; 4 A. ScoTt, supra note 2,
at §§ 398.1-.2.
103. G.G. BOGERT & G.T. BOGERT, supra note 2, at § 436; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TRUSTS § 399 comment c (1957).
104. See infra notes 134-36 and accompanying text.
105. See, e.g., Ebitz v. Pioneer Nat'l Bank, 372 Mass. 207, 361 N.E.2d 225 (1977).
106. The cy pres power may be preempted by specific gift-over provisions or instructions as
to the distribution of the trust funds.
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mation through the cy pres power.10 7 Inherent in the illegality rule is the
notion that a violation of public policy may also support a court's use of
cy pres: "A trust for a purpose the accomplishment of which is contrary
to public policy, although not forbidden by law, is invalid."' °8 This rule
is supported by a variety of cases. 09 Although private gender discrimi-
nation is not illegal absent a showing of state action or a specific statute,
in many situations gender discrimination may contravene public pol-
icy."0 It is on this public policy basis, in addition to constitutional
grounds, that courts should review gender-based restrictions in trust
instruments.
In order to apply the cy pres public policy standard, the court must
first identify the appropriate public policy standard to be applied to the
particular trusts. This identification may be difficult, since society's con-
ception of what constitutes a valid charitable purpose may change."'
107. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 377 (1957) ("a charitable trust cannot be cre-
ated for a purpose which is illegal").
108. Id. at § 377 comment c.
109. See, eg., Wooten v. Fitz-Gerald, 440 S.W.2d 719 (Tex. Civ. App. 1969) (court re-
formed a racial restriction that was not illegal, because it violated public policy against dis-
crimination). See also Sweet Briar Inst. v. Button, 280 F. Supp. 312 (W.D. Va. 1967) (court
refused to allow enforcement of a racial restriction in a bequest to establish a girl's school);
Coffee v. William Marsh Rice Univ., 408 S.W.2d 269 (Tex. Civ. App. 1966) (court permitted
deviation of trust terms to allow admittance of nonwhite students based upon the testator's
general charitable intent); In re Hill's Estate, 119 Wash. 62, 204 P. 1055, aft'd on rehearing,
119 Wash. 67, 207 P. 689 (1922) (court refused to permit a trust to support the teaching of
arcane medical knowledge given the potential danger to prospective patients and an obvious
public policy protecting such patients).
In certain instances the court is not asked to strike the controversial provision, but is
instead asked to enforce it. Courts may refuse to do so on similar public policy grounds. See
United States v. Hughes Memorial Home, 396 F. Supp. 544 (W.D. Va. 1975) (court ordered a
charitable children's home to ignore a racial restriction in a trust); Wachovia Bank & Trust
Co., N.A. v. Buchanan, 346 F. Supp. 665 (D.D.C. 1972) (court refused to require reversion of
a trust, and instead struck a discriminatory clause limiting trust distributions to "white boys
and girls"); In re Estate of Vanderhoofven, 18 Cal. App. 3d 940, 96 Cal. Rptr. 260 (1971)
(court remanded the case to require the lower court to determine whether testator would have
preferred reversion or reformation of a trust which limited particular scholarship recipients to
"all-white" applicants).
110. Wilson, 59 N.Y.2d at 472-73, 452 N.E.2d at 1233, 465 N.Y.S.2d at 905 (citing New
York state statutes requiring equal treatment of both sexes with regard to education and other
matters). See also Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 104 S. Ct. 3244 (1984) (enforcing a Minne-
sota statute that required equal access for both sexes at public meeting places).
It is clear that society rejects gender discrimination in a variety of contexts and education
is one of the more significant areas. See 20 U.S.C. § 1681 (1976) (Title IX). Moreover, permit-
ting discrimination in the area of education may be more harmful than in many other contexts
given the significant role education has in shaping both individual and group opportunities.
Finally, it seems that any justification for such discrimination is based on antiquated notions of
the roles of men and women in society that no longer hold true, much as racial discrimination
was once justified by courts but is now uniformly condemned.
111. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 368 comment b (1957) ("There is no fixed
standard to determine what purposes are of such social interest to the community."). See also
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Laudable community interests "vary with time and place." '12 For exam-
ple, some religions did not qualify as valid charitable purposes originally,
but are now accepted as socially beneficial.11 3 In the past, gender dis-
crimination was fully accepted.' 14 Although it remains unclear whether
all gender discrimination violates public policy,115 any permissible gen-
der discrimination by a state must be supported by a valid public
purpose. 11
6
The Wilson court's application of these general principles governing
cy pres is incomplete in two respects. First, the Wilson court did not
properly identify the public policy issue involving gender discrimination
in scholarships. Even though the Wilson and Johnson trusts were ad-
ministratively impracticable as written and therefore subject to change,
the gender restrictions could have been invalidated because they violated
public policy.1 17 The court suggested that gender discrimination violated
public policy with regard to education, but determined that the violation
did not "mitigate" the effect of the gift:
A provision in a charitable trust. . . that is central to the testa-
tor's or settlor's charitable purpose, and is not illegal, should not be
invalidated on public policy grounds unless that provision, if given
effect, would substantially mitigate the general charitable effect of
the gift.118
The court's use of this "mitigation" analysis is misplaced. 119 If in distrib-
Green v. Connally, 330 F. Supp. 1150, 1159 (D.D.C.), affid mem. sub nom. Coit v. Green, 404
U.S. 997 (1971) (upholding a decision by the Internal Revenue Service revoking charitable tax
status from racially discriminatory private schools based on the change in public policy).
112. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTs § 368 comment b (1957).
113. 4 A. Scor, supra note 2, at § 377 ("In England,. . . it was once held that a trust to
promote any religion but that of the established church was illegal.").
114. See, e.g., Bradwell v. Illinois, 83 U.S. 130, 141 (1872) (Bradley, J., concurring) (up-
holding a state law limiting the practice of law to males: "[T]he natural and proper timidity
and delicacy which belongs to the female sex evidently unfits it for many of the occupations of
civil life. ... The paramount destiny and mission of woman are to fulfil the noble and benign
offices of wife and mother. This is the law of the Creator."); Hoyt v. Florida, 368 U.S. 57, 62
(1961) (the Court upheld a law placing women on jury list only upon request noting that the
"woman is still regarded as the center of home and family life").
115. Compare Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973) (plurality opinion), with Mis-
sissippi Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718 (1982). See generally L. TRIBE, supra note
21, §§ 16-25 to 16-28.
116. Mississippi Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 724 (1982).
117. Wilson, 59 N.Y.2d at 471, 452 N.E.2d at 1232, 465 N.Y.S.2d at 904.
118. Id. at 473, 452 N.E.2d at 1233, 465 N.Y.S.2d at 905.
119. The court cited 4 A. Scorr, supra note 2, at § 399.4. In this section, Scott simply
restates a general rule according great deference to the settlor's intent as to the trust's form and
nature. Moreover, the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 377 equates public policy and
illegality, as does Scott. See 4 A. ScoTr, supra note 2, at § 377.
Initially, a court should examine whether the trust is valid or invalid. The question of
invalidity does not lend itself to a mitigation analysis, especially when it is based on public
policy or illegality grounds. The concept of mitigation is only meaningful when the trust's
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uting funds the trust offends public policy, whether or not some individu-
als derive benefit is not germane. Presumably, an individual who receives
a scholarship from an invidious race-restricted trust will still receive edu-
cational benefits; thus, the effect of the gift would not be "mitigated."
Society does not wish to promote the dedication of resources to goals at
odds with recognized public policy. 120
After this statement of the law, the Wilson court continued its pub-
lic policy analysis with an excellent review of those policy issues that
support gender discrimination in trust instruments.121 The court noted
that although continued private support for the charitable cause of fe-
male-restricted scholarships was desirable, these sex-based conditions in
trusts could be declared invalid.1 22 The court felt that settlors must be
allowed flexibility in establishing the terms and conditions of trust instru-
ments in order to encourage continued giving.123 Thus, the court could
have concluded that gender restrictions in scholarship trusts do not vio-
late public policy.124
A second Wilson court shortcoming was the court's analysis of the
settlor's intentions. Inherent in any analysis of the public policy aspects
of disposition of trust resources is a determination of the general and
specific intent of the settlor.1 25 The United States Supreme Court consid-
ered this issue in Evans v. Abney. 126 There the Court affirmed a decision
that required reversion of a segregated public park held in trust, rather
than reformation of the trust to require the park's desegregation. 127 For-
mer Senator Bacon of Georgia estabished the trust in his will. It pro-
vided that:
[T]he said property under no circumstances. . . [is] to be. . . at
any time for any reason devoted to any other purpose. . . [and] I
am, however, without hesitation in the opinion that in their social
purpose may be frustrated administratively by waste of funds, duplication of effort, or a lack of
sufficient funds to achieve the purpose.
120. 4 A. Scorr, supra note 2, at § 399. The purpose of the charitable trust is to provide a
private source of funding for public activities; thus, if those resources are contributed to the
public in such a way as to injure the public welfare the purpose is defeated. See supra notes 89,
102-04 and accompanying text.
121. Wilson, 59 N.Y.2d at 473, 452 N.E.2d at 1233, 465 N.Y.S.2d at 905.
122. Id.; see supra note 77.
123. Id.
124. The court stated that gender-restricted trusts should not be altered because the policy
opposing gender discrimination is not sufficient to "mitigate" the value of the contribution of
scholarship funds; students will still benefit from the trusts. 59 N.Y.2d at 473, 452 N.E.2d at
1233, 465 N.Y.S.2d at 905. Instead, the court could have concluded that gender-restricted
scholarship trusts are not contrary to public policy since both women and men receive benefits
from restricted sources and perhaps the total quantity of contributions is increased because the
settlor is free to donate according to his or her wishes. Id.
125. See supra text accompanying notes 89, 102-04.
126. 396 U.S. 435 (1970).
127. Id. at 446.
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relations the two races . . . should be forever separate and that
they should not have pleasure or recreation grounds to be used or
enjoyed, together and in common. 128
Senator Bacon's general charitable intent to establish a park was clear,
but it was limited by his specific segregative purpose. Given the explicit
language requiring segregation, the Court held that the park could not be
desegregated; even though the trust that created the park had operated
for over sixty years, the park could still revert to the heirs of Senator
Bacon. 129 Thus, the Court did not apply the doctrine of cy pres due to
the specificity of the trust instrument.130
In Wilson, however, the settlors did not restrict the use of the trust
funds with explicit language such as that used by Senator Bacon. Yet,
the court opted for a very narrow reading of both Wilson's and Johnson's
intentions: "In establishing these trusts, the testators expressly and un-
equivocally intended that they provide for the educational expenses of
male students."'13' Elsewhere the court found gender discrimination
"central" to the charitable purpose. 132 While it has been noted that con-
struing a testator's intent is not an exact science, 33 the court's analysis
was, at best, conclusory. Although each testator expressly stated that the
trust recipients should be male, their overriding goal appears to have
been to aid prospective college students from the school districts.' 34 The
settlors' designation of a male class of trust beneficiaries did not manifest
the discriminatory intent obvious in Senator Bacon's will. 35 Thus, the
court in Wilson may have overemphasized the trust's restrictions.136
128. Id. at 441-42.
129. Id. at 444.
130. Id. at 447.
131. Wilson, 59 N.Y.2d at 472, 452 N.E.2d at 1233, 465 N.Y.S.2d at 905.
132. Id. at 472, 452 N.E.2d at 1233, 465 N.Y.S.2d at 905.
133. G.G. BOGERT & G.T. BOGERT, supra note 2, at § 436; 4 A. ScoTr, supra note 2, at
§ 399.2.
134. While each settlor designated that recipients should be male, the trust instruments did
not include any additional language that would indicate that the designation of males was of
any special significance. 59 N.Y.2d at 474, 452 N.E.2d at 1234, 465 N.Y.S.2d at 906.
135. An illuminating explanation of the distinction of charitable intent can be found in
Trammell v. Elliot, 230 Ga. 841, 199 S.E.2d 194 (1973). The Georgia Supreme Court distin-
guished Evans from a scholarship trust for white boys and girls and used cy pres to strike a
race restriction in the instrument. The court correctly noted that cy pres may be applied
unless there is a showing of intent which is "clear, definite and unambiguous." Id. at 847, 199
S.E.2d at 198-99.
136. Additional language on a particular subject or numerous references in the trust docu-
ment seem to be a prerequisite to a court finding an "unequivocal" intent. See, eg., Ebitz v.
Pioneer Nat'l Bank, 372 Mass. 207, 361 N.E.2d 225 (1977). In Ebitz, the court used extrinsic
evidence and a lack of additional references to the restriction to interpret the phrase, "to aid
and assist worthy and ambitious young men to acquire a legal education. . ." as a generic use
of the word men that included women. Id. at 209-11, 361 N.E.2d at 226-27.
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IV. The Middle-Tier Test: A Test of Public Policy?
Constitutional law provides one approach for reviewing and altering
gender restrictions. Traditional trust law, however, provides a similar
though not identical opportunity without having to address the state ac-
tion issue. Despite the similarities between trust law's public policy test
and constitutional law's middle-tier test, courts have not compared them.
Both fields of law weigh the public policy objectives involved against the
necessity for contravening that policy in a specific case. In the trust law
area, the court identifies the general charitable purpose that justifies the
dedication of funds to a particular goal.137 Under the middle-tier test,
the court isolates public policy when it identifies the important govern-
mental interest. 138
A review of the Wilson decision and the supreme court decision in
Johnson demonstrates the similarities and differences between the impor-
tant governmental interest requirement of constitutional law and the
charitable purpose requirement of trust law. The constitutional law anal-
ysis by the supreme court in Johnson,139 identified the state's interest in
"higher education" as an important governmental interest sufficient to
support gender discrimination."4 The Johnson court then analyzed the
gender restriction in the trust to determine whether it was "substantially
related" to achievement of the higher education goal. The Court con-
cluded that it was not,"' but did not consider that other important state
objectives may also be involved, or alternatively that settlor flexibility
furthers higher education by encouraging scholarship contributions.142
The Johnson court's interpretation of the substantial relation re-
quirement is narrower than that of the United States Supreme Court.
The Court examines a variety of factors to determine whether discrimi-
natory restrictions bear a "substantial relation" to a valid state objec-
tive.143 For example, the Court recently approved federal legislation that
137. See supra notes 89, 102-04 and accompanying text.
138. See supra notes 71-75 and infra note 140 and accompanying text.
139. The court of appeal in Wilson never reached the equal protection standard since it
found no state action. See supra notes 53-54 and accompanying text.
140. The United States Supreme Court's gender discrimination holdings support this view,
since the Court has found a variety of state interests "important." See, e.g., Kahn v. Shevin,
416 U.S. 351 (1974) (the reduction of economic disparity caused by past discrimination was a
valid state interest); Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976) (increased highway safety was a
legitimate state objective, but the disputed statute was substantially unrelated to the objective).
141. In re Johnson, 93 A.D.2d 1, 460 N.Y.S.2d 932 (N.Y. App. Div. 1983).
142. Wilson, 59 N.Y.2d at 473, 452 N.E.2d at 1233, 465 N.Y.S.2d at 905.
143. See Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 198 (1976) (the Court usually takes action only
when the statute uses gender as a "proxy for other, more germane bases of classification");
Mississippi Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 725-26 (1982) ("The purpose of requir-
ing that close relationship is to assure that the validity of a classification is determined through
reasoned analysis rather than through the mechanical application of traditional, often inaccu-
rate, assumptions about the proper roles of men and women.").
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reinstituted discriminatory provisions it had previously struck down. 1"
The Court held that the discriminatory provisions were the only effective
way to achieve the important governmental objective of protecting the
reliance interest of certain social security recipients whose benefits had
been removed. 145 Thus, the Court considers the purpose of the classifica-
tion and upholds discrimination if the discrimination is necessary to fur-
ther valid and important state interests. 146
Alternatively, the Court will strike provisions if the state interest
supporting the discrimination is insufficient. 47 For instance, in Missis-
sippi University for Women v. Hogan,14 the Court considered whether
past discrimination against women in higher education could support a
restriction excluding men from a nursing school. The Court concluded
that it could not, since women have traditionally dominated the nursing
profession.149
The weighing of important governmental interests is similar to the
policy analysis used to determine the validity of a charitable trust. In
Wilson, the New York Court of Appeals identified education as the char-
itable purpose supporting the trusts. However, unlike the supreme court
in Johnson, it also considered settlor freedom in its broad analysis of the
trusts' overall charitable nature. 150 Just as a court analyzes the relation-
ship between the gender discrimination and the state's interest when us-
ing constitutional law, the Wilson court then determined whether the
gender restrictions comported with the general charitable purpose of the
two trusts. The court concluded that the general charitable purposes
were not mitigated, although public policy opposed gender discrimina-
144. Heckler v. Mathews, 104 S. Ct. 1387 (1984).
145. Id. at 1400.
146. Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 200 (1976).
147. Id. at 204 (the Court recognized highway safety as a policy rationale, but found that
the evidence did not demonstrate that the statute achieved the objective).
148. 458 U.S. 718 (1982).
149. Id. at 727-3 1.
150. The trust review covers a wide scope and courts may consider the impact of numerous
potential state interests. In Green v. Connally, 330 F. Supp. 1150 (D.D.C.), aff'd mem. sub
nom. Coit v. Green, 404 U.S. 997 (1971), the court noted: "Analysis of the contribution of a
trust purpose to the benefit of the community must take into account broad principles of the
general welfare, as expounded, inter alia, in constitutions, statutes, and court decisions."
Courts "will not only carefully examine the trust instrument and the circumstances of the
donor in the light of social, economic and political conditions of which the court takes judicial
notice, but will also receive the testimony of experts as to the probable effect of the trust." 330
F. Supp. at 1159. G.G. BOGERT & G.T. BOGERT, supra note 2, at § 368. Thus, in the trust
law context, the court may consider any possible evils that may result from the trust's opera-
tion. See, eg., In re Hill's Estate, 119 Wash. 62, 204 P. 1055, afl'd on rehearing, 119 Wash. 67,
207 P. 689 (1922) (the court refused to permit a trust to support the teaching of arcane medical
knowledge given the potential danger to prospective patients and an obvious public policy
protecting these patients).
In contrast, the constitutional standard is more confined in scope since equal protection
analysis only considers any possible evils that may result from discrimination.
tion in education.1
51
The Wilson decision illustrates the various public interests consid-
ered under the trust law public policy analysis. The variety of interests is
reviewed to determine whether discriminatory restrictions offend public
policy and destroy the charitable nature of the instrument. For example,
the Wilson court approved the gender restrictions, despite its determina-
tion that such restrictions were opposed to educational public policy.
15 2
The court determined that gender discrimination served the public inter-
ests of remedying past discrimination,153 and of increasing the funds
available for education.1 5 4 Thus, courts consider competing public pol-
icy goals and uphold gender discrimination if the balance of policy objec-
tives favors the restriction. In particular, trust law may allow a single
instrument to impinge upon a recognized public policy against discrimi-
nation, on the premise that the entire collection of charitable trusts de-
pend upon settlor flexibility.155 Consequently, while trust law may
provide an alternative analysis, courts may be unwilling to strike gender
restrictions on this basis. Wilson dramatizes the case-by-case nature of
the analysis.
Thus, just as constitutional analysis allows gender discrimination
when the discrimination achieves important state interests, trust law al-
lows divergence from recognized public policy when the divergence fur-
thers a paramount policy of implementing the settlor's intent. In both
contexts, some gender discrimination is permissible. 56 However, trust
law dispenses with the frustrating state action issue and allows the trust
to be challenged directly. 57
Conclusion
Doubtless, a long chain of challenges to gender discrimination in
scholarship trusts will be presented to courts. While challenges thus far
have focused on the trusts' illegality based on equal protection grounds,
an additional approach is available within the context of traditional trust
law. In fact, trust law challenges require a public policy analysis similar
to the gender-discrimination middle-tier standard, without the attendant
difliculty of establishing state action.
In re Estate of Wilson is the first gender discrimination scholarship
trust decision that seriously considers and discusses the trust law alterna-
tive. A careful analysis of the policy issues that support and oppose gen-
151. See supra notes 118-19 and accompanying text.
152. Wilson, 59 N.Y.2d at 472-73, 452 N.E.2d at 1233, 465 N.Y.S.2d at 905.
153. See supra text accompanying note 122.
154. See supra text accompanying note 123.
155. See supra text accompanying notes 82, 123.
156. Heckler v. Mathews, 104 S. Ct. 1387 (1984).
157. See supra notes 53-54 and accompanying text.
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der discrimination in charitable scholarship trusts may in some cases
offer an alternative basis on which a court could strike the discriminatory
provisions. However, the policy that underlies the charitable trust-the
ability of a settlor to direct the disposition of his or her wealth-directly
conflicts with efforts to remedy gender discrimination in the trust context
and poses a very difficult puzzle. 58 The resolution of the policy tug-of-
war between the public goals of prohibiting gender discrimination and
implementing an individual's request as to the distribution of trust prop-
erty is essential if either goal is to be effective. Courts must consider this
dilemma, and the common law relating to charitable trusts provides one
method of resolving the tensions inherent between these policies.
158. See supra notes 21, 82 and accompanying text.
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